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More and more states are recognizing same-sex marriage 
and civil unions. Further, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act 
may no longer be the law of the land in the not-too-distant 
future. 1 The growing acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
trans gender (LG BT) families represented by these 
developments may have a variety of implications, for example, 
some teachers and school boards may feel increased pressure to 
modify their public school curricula to keep abreast of some of 
these changes in public opinion and include references to LGBT 
families during the school day. 
Commentators suggest that some with religious views 
opposing same-sex marriage will not welcome such changes in 
school curricula. While that may be so, faith-based opposition 
by religious parents would not alone justify the exclusion of 
such references during the school day. If a rule were adopted 
precluding school children from being exposed to anything that 
might be thought to undermine someone's religious beliefs and 
values, then schoolchildren would be exposed to very little. 
Certainly, it is by no means easy to achieve a balance 
between developing curricula on the one hand and respecting 
the sincere religious and moral concerns of parents on the 
other, especially given the great variation in moral and 
religious belief in our country. Yet, if children are going to 
learn about and be prepared for the world in which they live, 
then they must be taught about individuals who may be unlike 
*Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. 
1. See, e.g, Mass. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 
2:H (D. Mass. 2010) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act provision defining 
marriage for federal purposes). 
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themselves. This article discusses the inclusion of LGBT 
families in public school curricula, focusing on two cases that 
illustrate some of the difficulties posed for schools seeking to 
educate the students in their care when parents assert that the 
curriculum is undercutting their sincerely held religious 
convictions. 
II. SCHOOL CURRICULA AND CONTROVERSIAL MATERIALS 
Over the past few decades, parents have challenged the 
kinds of curricula offered in the public schools, claiming that 
the introduction of certain topics contravenes their religious 
convictions. Sometimes, parents seek to have their children 
exempted from instruction or discussions involving certain 
issues, which may impose more of a burden on the schools than 
might initially be apparent. Two cases-Mozert v. Hawkins 
County Board of Education2 and Parker v. Hurley3-illustrate 
some of the difficult issues that must be confronted when 
parents feel that their religious beliefs and values are 
threatened by the subject matters taught in the public school 
classroom. 
A. Mozert 
Mozert is a seminal case, pitting a school system against 
the right of parents to limit their children's exposure to ideas 
not in accord with the parents' religious beliefs and values. The 
Sixth Circuit examined whether "a public school requirement 
that all students in grades one through eight use a prescribed 
set of reading textbooks violated the constitutional rights of 
objecting parents and students."4 The parents suggested that 
the books at issue contained material that undermined the 
world view that they wished their children to have. 
While the parents did not frame the issue in quite this way, 
at least one of the problems posed was that the school system 
taught "critical reading,''5 which required students to develop 
"higher order cognitive skills that enable students to evaluate 
the material they read, to contrast the ideas presented, and to 
2. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
3. 511 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
1. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1059. 
5. Id. at 1060. 
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understand complex characters that appear in reading 
material."6 The parents did not challenge whether "critical 
reading is an essential skill which ... children must develop in 
order to succeed in other subjects and to function as effective 
participants in modern society,"7 and instead focused on the 
particular textbook choices made by the school board. 
Nonetheless, the basic objection of at least some of the parents 
was that the exposure of the children to certain concepts and 
ways of looking at the world would itself undermine the 
religious outlook that the parents wished their children to 
have.x 
Vicki Frost was the mother of four children, three of whom 
were in the public schools in 1983.9 Mrs. Frost found that 
several of the themes included in the assigned reading were 
troubling, such as the mental telepathy in one of the stories in 
a sixth grade reader. 1 ° Further, after spending nearly 200 
hours reviewing the series of books assigned in the schools, she 
found numerous passages that were religiously offensive 11-for 
example, passages describing "Leonardo da Vinci as the human 
with a creative mind that came closest to the divine touch" 12 or 
advocating "the use of imagination as a vehicle for seeing 
things not discernible through our physical eyes." 13 The Sixth 
Circuit noted that there was a theme that was common to the 
testimony of several of the objecting witnesses, namely, that 
the "materials objected to 'could' be interpreted in a manner 
repugnant to their religious beliefs." 14 Rather than take a 
chance that the materials would be understood by their 
children in a way contrary to faith, the parents wanted to make 
sure that their children would not be exposed to these 
potentially divisive ideas. 
One parent, Bob Mozert, testified that he found certain 
passages religiously offensive, because they dealt with "role 
6. !d. 
7. !d. 
8. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
9. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060. 
10. !d. 
11. !d. at 1061. See also Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 683 
(7th Cir. 1991) (detailing some of the reading topics that the parents believed would 
undermine their religious beliefs). 
12. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062. 
13. !d. 
11. !d. 
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reversal or role elimination, particularly biographical material 
about women who have been recognized for achievements 
outside their homes." 15 He seemed worried that his children 
might be led to misunderstand the "proper" roles of the sexes, 16 
although the opinion did not specify the sexes of his children. 17 
It might be noted that religious convictions do not always 
mirror equal protection jurisprudence or public policy. For 
example, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of 
looking past "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of 
males and females," 18 precisely because of the importance of 
making legislative decisions based on "reasoned analysis rather 
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often 
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and 
women." 19 Nonetheless, some religious traditions suggest that 
women as a general matter should take on the traditional role 
of stay-at-home wife and mother.2° 
Under cross examination, Mozert and Frost testified that 
they "objected to passages that expose their children to other 
forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes and values of 
other students that contradict the plaintiffs' religious views 
without a statement that the other views are incorrect and that 
the plaintiffs' views are the correct ones."21 Basically, the 
parents wanted to reduce the chances that their children would 
be exposed to non-conforming beliefs and attitudes, although it 
seems likely that the children would have some exposure to 
different views just by virtue of being at a public school where 
there might be children from a variety of backgrounds, who 
might be living in any number of different family settings, and 
might have a broad range of views about a variety of matters. 
15. Jd. 
16. Mozert was the father of a middle-school and an elementary school student. 
See id. 
17. He and his wife were the guardians ad litem for Travis and Sundee. see id. at 
1058, which presumably means that they had a boy and a girl. 
18. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
19. !d. at 726. 
20. See Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: 
Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 164:3-44 (2001) 
("Religious fundamentalism appears to have a significant effect on the preference for 
this kind of patriarchal family, and conservative Christian views about women's proper 
domestic roles as wife and mother appear to exert a significant effect on women's labor 
force participation, such that 'fundamentalist women arc significantly more likely to 
choose the home as their career in their early life course.'"). 
21. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062. 
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The parents were not claiming that their children had been 
forced to affirm ideas contrary to faith. 22 Had the children been 
forced to do that, their constitutional rights would have been 
violated. As the United States Supreme Court made clear long 
ago, "if there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein."23 Rather, what was at issue here was 
the parents' objection to the introduction of other people's 
feelings, beliefs, and attitudes without an accompanying 
suggestion that those views not coinciding with the parents' 
views were incorrect. 
Mrs. Frost did not argue that it would be unacceptable to 
expose her children to other religions and philosophies at all.24 
Rather, she said that "if the practices of other religions were 
described in detail, or if the philosophy was 'profound' in that it 
expressed a world view that deeply undermined her religious 
beliefs, then her children 'would have to be instructed to [the] 
error [of the other philosophy]."'25 However, the opportunities 
for a profound disagreement were great, because Mrs. Frost's 
own worldview provided a basis from which all situations and 
beliefs should be judged,26 which presumably meant that any 
situation that might be discussed in the classroom would 
potentially come in conflict with the view that she sincerely 
held. Indeed, Mrs. Frost suggested that there were certain 
topics, for example feminism, that simply could not be broached 
without violating her beliefs.27 
22. ld. at 1 06a-61 ("The plaintiffs did not produce a single student or teacher to 
testify that any student was ever required to atiirm his or her belief or disbelief in any 
idea or practice mentioned in the various stories and passages contained in the Holt 
series."). 
28. West Ya. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :319 U.S. 624, 642 (194a). 
21. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1061. 
25. Jd. 
26. Jd. ("The plaintiffs view every human situation and decision, whether related 
to personal belief and conduct or to public policy and programs, from a theological or 
religious perspective."). 
27. Jd. ("She identified such themes as evolution, false supernaturalism, 
feminism, telepathy and magic as matters that could not be presented in any way 
without offending her beliefs."). 
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As a separate matter, there was testimony that there was 
too little discussion of Judea-Christian concepts in the class.28 
However, as the Sixth Circuit pointed out, changing the 
balance of discussion might well have caused individuals of 
other faiths to complain.29 The court might have made a 
further point. Even if there had been more discussion of "these 
two dominant religions in the United States,"30 the plaintiff 
might well have objected anyway, because the additional 
discussion of these religions might have involved positions to 
which she did not want her children exposed. For example, it 
would not be surprising if she did not approve of increased 
discussion of a religion that does not recognize the divinity of 
Jesus Christ. Presumably, she also would not agree with views 
that certain other Christians hold. 3 1 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit 
noted that there was "evidence that other members of their 
churches, and even their pastors, do not agree with their 
position in this case."32 
The point should not be misunderstood. There is no 
requirement for other members of one's faith to agree with 
one's religious views in order for one's views to count as 
religious. The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
"the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which 
are shared by all of the members of a religious sect,"33 
especially because "it is not within the judicial function and 
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or 
[others] more correctly perceived the commands of their 
common faith."34 Thus, the point here is not that Mrs. Frost 
and the other plaintiffs misunderstood their faith. Rather, it is 
merely to point out that so much would potentially contradict 
their views that it would be very difficult during the school day 
to avoid everything that was objectionable, especially if part of 
28. Id. at 1064-65 ("[P]laintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Vitz, ... found 'markedly 
little reference to religion, particularly Christianity, and also remarkably little to 
Judaism' in the Holt series. His solution would be to 'beef up' the references to these 
two dominant religions in the United States."). 
29. I d. at 1065. 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of 
Family Law, 110 W.VA. L. REV. 159, 4 76 (2007) (discussing the liberal sexual views of 
certain Christians). 
32. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1061. 
33. Thomas v. Review Bd. of lnd. Emp't Sec. Div., 150 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). 
34. ld. at 716. 
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the program was designed to encourage critical reading, 
thinking, and discussion throughout the school day.35 
Arguably, all the school was doing was exposing the children to 
different viewpoints,36 but even this might be objectionable to 
the parents unless the divergent views were labeled as 
incorrect. 37 
One of the difficulties in understanding what was being 
contested in Mozert was that there was some confusion about 
what the parents believed their children were being taught. 
The Sixth Circuit noted that "the plaintiffs appeared to assume 
that materials clearly presented as poetry, fiction and even 
'make-believe' in the Holt series were presented as facts, which 
the students were required to believe,"38 although there was 
absolutely nothing in the record to support that these materials 
were presented that way. 39 One cannot tell whether the 
parents would still have objected if they had understood that 
the children were not being required, for example, to affirm the 
truth of the make-believe materials. That said, however, when 
a parent objects to in-depth discussions of alternative belief 
systems and world views,40 it does not seem plausible to believe 
that her only worry is that her children might be forced to 
make affirmations contrary to faith. After all, the teacher could 
be careful to expose the children to several incompatible visions 
of the world, such that it would be impossible for the children 
to affirm all of the material presented. One infers that Mrs. 
Frost, for example, would not have been satisfied had her 
children been exposed to such a smorgasbord of ideas; on the 
35. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This is particularly true 
in grades one through four where reading is taught throughout the school day, rather 
than in a particular period. Appellants would be unable to utilize effectively the critical 
reading teaching method and accommodate appellees' religious beliefs."). 
:36. !d. at 1069 ("The only conduct compelled hy the defendants was reading and 
discussing the material in the Holt series, and hearing other students' interpretations 
of those materials. This is the exposure to which the plaintiffs objected."). 
37. See id. at 1062. 
38. !d. at 1064. Cf. Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 (7th 
Cir. 1991) ("'n addition, this 'religion' that is allegedly heing established seems for all 
the world like a collection of exercises in 'make-believe' designed to develop and 
encourage the use of imagination and reading skills in children that are the staple of 
traditional public elementary school education."). 
:39. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1064. 
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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contrary, it was the very variety of approaches that made her 
worry.41 
One understanding of Mrs. Frost's concern was that the 
exposure of her children to the different world views and to the 
importance of critical thinking would themselves undermine 
the approach that she was teaching her children to use. She 
might say, for example, that in future when her children would 
be confronted with something novel or contrary to what they 
had been taught, she would not want them to try to analyze the 
issue from a variety of perspectives or even use critical 
thinking to reach some resolution. Instead, she would want 
them to understand that all answers come from the correct 
understanding of the Bible. 
If understood in this way, Mrs. Frost's contention would be 
reminiscent of the claims set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder42 that 
the schooling would undermine the children's correct 
understanding of the world. That case involved a Wisconsin 
statute requiring students to attend public or private school 
until age sixteen.43 The Yoders did not want their children to 
go to school beyond the eighth grade,44 because they believed 
that high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific 
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly 
success, and social life with other students. Amish society 
emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of 
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than 
technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than 
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, 
contemporary worldly society.45 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the 
Yoders to withdraw their children from further formal 
schooling once those children had finished the eighth grade.46 
Yet, the issue in Mozert was not whether the children could be 
home-schooled or receive instruction in another setting where 
41. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
43. Id. at 207. 
44. See id. 
45. Id. at 211. 
46. Id. at 236. 
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the parents' views were more likely to be supported47 but, 
instead, whether the students could attend the school but 
nonetheless be exempted from any discussions that might 
undermine the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and values.48 
The Sixth Circuit suggested that "governmental actions 
that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs do not on 
that account violate free exercise."49 The court drew a 
distinction between "those governmental actions that actually 
interfere with the exercise of religion and those that merely 
require or result in exposure to attitudes and outlooks at odds 
with perspectives prompted by religion."50 If exposure to 
different ideas were enough to constitute interference with 
religious exercise, then many discussions of currents events 
would almost necessarily interfere with someone's religious 
exercise. 51 
The Sixth Circuit held that the "requirement that public 
school students study a basal reader series chosen by the school 
authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden under 
the Free Exercise Clause when the students are not required to 
affirm or deny a belief or engage or refrain from engaging in a 
practice prohibited or required by their religion."52 The court 
did not examine whether forcing the students to engage in 
critical thinking and analysis might itself contradict the 
religious views of the parents, since it was "not clear that the 
plaintiffs object to all critical reading."53 The court noted that 
Mrs. Frost had merely said that "she did not want her children 
to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where 
the Bible provides the answer."54 However, it was not as if 
those areas of life to which Biblical teachings were applicable 
were limited in number. On the contrary, "to the plaintiffs 
47. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060 ("Most of the plaintiff students were ultimately 
taught at home, or attended religious schools, or transferred to public schools outside 
Hawkins County."). 
18. See id. at 1061. 
19. !d. at 1068 (citing Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 351, 753 F.2d 1528, 1513 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., concurring)). 
50. ld. at 1068 (citing Grove, 75:1 F.2d at 1543 (Canby, J., concurring)). 
51. !d. (noting that where the "free exercise clause violated whenever 
governmental activity is offensive to or at variance with sincerely held religious 
precepts, virtually no governmental program would be constitutionally possible."). 
52. Jd. at 1070. 
5:i. /d. at 1069 (emphasis added). 
54. ld. 
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there is but one acceptable view-the Biblical view, as they 
interpret the Bible. Furthermore, the plaintiffs view every 
human situation and decision, whether related to personal 
belief and conduct or to public policy and programs, from a 
theological or religious perspective."55 
Although "witnesses testified that reading the Holt series 
'could' or 'might' lead the students to come to conclusions that 
were contrary to teachings of their and their parents' religious 
beliefs,"56 the Sixth Circuit was not persuaded that this mere 
possibility was "sufficient to establish an unconstitutional 
burden."57 Yet, the court would likely not have been convinced 
that an unconstitutional burden had been imposed even had a 
stronger case been made that the curriculum was attitude-
changing. 
Suppose, for example, that evidence were offered that 
students listening to discussions at school began to reject some 
of the views of their parents. As long as the students were 
deciding for themselves what to believe rather than were being 
forced against their wills to accept some proposition, the state 
would not have violated constitutional guarantees simply by 
exposing the students to views that they ultimately found 
persuasive. 58 Yet, if the important factor is whether the 
student is deciding for herself what to believe, then the real 
issue is not the relative degree of likelihood that the student 
will reach unwelcome conclusions, which is what one might 
have inferred from the court's highlighting that the student 
"could" or "might" make certain judgments. Rather, the focus is 
on whether the state is exposing the students to a variety of 
ideas and then letting the students reach their own conclusions 
rather than imposing certain beliefs on the students or coercing 
the students into adopting or affirming certain views. 
The Sixth Circuit did not address the substance of the 
policy at issue. 59 Further, the court did not say that it would 
have been impermissible to reach some compromise that would 
55. Id. at 1064. 
56. ld. at 1070. 
57. ld. 
58. See id. at 1068. 
59. !d. at 1073 (Boggs, J., concurring) ("we make no judgment on the educational, 
political or social soundness of the school board's decision to adopt this particular set of 
books and this general curricular approach"). 
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have been more satisfactory to the parents. 60 Rather, the court 
simply tried to flesh out what must be shown to establish that 
the state is imposing too great of a burden on the religious 
views of the parents and students.61 Exposing children in a 
public school setting to different worldviews and trying to 
develop critical thinking skills within those children does not 
constitute a violation of constitutional guarantees. 
B. Parker 
A little over twenty years after Mozert was decided, the 
First Circuit was asked to address the kinds of 
accommodations that a school must make for parents with 
religious objections to some of the curriculum's content. In 
Parker v. Hurley, 62 parents sued the Lexington, Massachusetts 
school district because they wanted to be given the opportunity 
to exempt their children from religiously repugnant books.63 
One set of parents, the Parkers, objected to a book given to 
first-graders that included a discussion of diverse families 
including families where both parents were of the same sex.64 
The other set of parents, the Wirthlins, objected to a second 
grade teacher's reading to her class a book that depicted and 
celebrated a same-sex marriage.65 The parents did not 
challenge the use of these books as part of a "nondiscrimination 
curriculum in the public schools."66 Instead, they wanted prior 
notice about the materials that would be used in class and an 
exemption from any instruction that they believed might be 
contrary to faith, although they said that this would no longer 
be necessary once their children reached the seventh grade.67 
As an initial matter, it is helpful to examine some of the 
objectionable material. For example, Jacob, a kindergartener, 
60. Cf id. (noting that at "the classroom level, the pupils and teachers in these 
schools had in most cases reached a working accommodation"). 
61. ld. (noting that the case "is about the constitutional limits on the powers of 
school boards to prescribe a curriculum"). 
62. Parker, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
63. /d. at 90. 
64. !d. ("The Parkers object to their child being presented in kindergarten and 
first grade with two hooks that portray diverse families, including families in which 
both parents are of the same gender."). 
65. ld. ("The Wirthlins object to a second-grade teacher's reading to their son's 
class a book that depicts and celebrates a gay marriage."). 
66. ld. 
67. /d. 
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brought home a "Diversity Book Bag"6g that included 
depictions of different families including "single-parent 
families, an extended family, interracial families, animal 
families, a family without children, and ... a family with two 
dads and a family with two moms."69 
The Diversity Book Bag was brought home in January 
2005,70 which was over a year after the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts had held that the state's same-sex marriage 
ban violated state constitutional guarantees.71 Yet, as the First 
Circuit noted, the book did not mention anything about same-
sex marriage,72 so it was not as if Massachusetts's recognition 
of same-sex unions would somehow have been a necessary 
condition for a discussion of families involving parents of the 
same sex. Indeed, Massachusetts had recognized that two 
adults of the same sex could each be the legal parent of the 
same child a decade before Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health was decided.73 Thus, the information that was 
presented in this Book Bag might have been presented even 
before Massachusetts had begun formal recognition of same-
sex marnages. 
Consider a state that does not afford legal recognition to 
same-sex unions and, further, does not permit two individuals 
of the same sex to become the legal parents of the same child. 
Would it make sense to have the Diversity Book Bag be part of 
the curriculum in such a state? 
Elementary education serves a variety of goals, 74 including 
promoting good citizenship 75 and learning how to get along 
68. ld. at 92. 
69. Id. 
70. Jd. 
71. ld. ("On November 18, 20Ui3, a divided Supreme ,Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held, in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.K2d 941 (Mass. 
2003), that the state constitution mandates the recognition of same-sex marriage."). 
72. ld. at 92. 
73. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d :n5, 321 (Mass. 1993) (holding that each 
member of a same-sex couple can be the legal parent of the same child). 
74. Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., :H2 F.3d 271, 275-76 (3d 
Cir. 2003) ("Elementary schools arc responsible for teaching young children basic 
social, behavioral, and academic lessons in a structured environment."). 
75. West Va. State Dd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :l19 U.S. 624, 6:17 (191:i) (states "are 
educating the young for citizenship"). 
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better with others.76 But getting along well with others may 
well be facilitated when one learns that other children live in 
families unlike one's own, whether those families involve one 
parent, two parents of different races or religions, or two 
parents of the same sex. Further, it should be noted that even a 
state that does not permit second-parent adoptions within the 
jurisdiction would still have to recognize such a final adoption 
that had been validly performed in a sister state. 77 This means 
that one child might have two legal parents of the same sex in 
any state of the union, for example, because the parents 
established their legal relationship with their child in one state 
but then moved to another. For example, Oklahoma does not 
allow two individuals of the same sex to adopt a child. 78 
However, two members of a same-sex couple who adopt a child 
in California and then move to Oklahoma would have their 
legal relationships with the child recognized, notwithstanding 
that such an adoption could not have been performed within 
the state.79 
Suppose that the law were different and that states were 
not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize 
adoptions finalized in other states. Even so, that would not 
obviate the desirability of having schoolchildren realize that 
some of their classmates may live in family settings unlike 
their own. Nor would it obviate the desirability of having 
children in alternative family settings realize that they are not 
alone and that others live in nontraditional families. 
The Diversity Book Bag was not offering a legal definition 
of family, as is evidenced by its referring to animal families. 
76. Cf. .John T. Berry, A Check-Up on the Health of the Legal Profession, 17 PROF. 
LAW. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing a judge who guessed that "the lawyers in this case did not 
attend kindergarten, as they never learned how to get along well with others"). 
77. See Finstucn v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 11::39, 1141 (lOth Cir. 2007) ("We hold that 
final adoption orders by a state court of competent jurisdiction are judgments that 
must be given full faith and credit under the Constitution by every other state in the 
nation."). 
78. See id. at 1149 ("[tjhe statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 750::3-1.1 (West 
2009), categorically denies unmarried couples eligibility to adopt a child."). Oklahoma 
docs not allow same-sex couples to marry. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4::3, § ::l(A) (West 
2009) ("Any unmarried person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and not 
otherwise disqualified is capable of contracting and consenting to marriage with a 
person of the opposite sex."). 
79. See Finstuen. 496 F.::ld at 1156 ("We hold today that final adoption orders and 
decrees are judgments that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause."). 
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But in that event, inclusion of these families in a book does not 
imply that the state affords such families legal recognition. Nor 
does it imply that the state is offering an endorsement of these 
families. Rather, inclusion merely involves an acknowledgment 
that such families exist. If one of the goals of the schools is to 
teach children that there are many types of family settings, 
then children should be presented with a wide assortment of 
households, some but not others containing children and some 
but not others that are afforded formal legal recognition. 
Many commentators bemoan the breakdown of the family, 80 
worrying that the great number of single parents bodes poorly 
for society. 81 Yet, presumably, inclusion of single-parent 
families within the families in the Diversity Book Bag should 
not be criticized as an endorsement of single-parent 
households. Rather, it should be understood as a 
representation of one kind of family. Further, refusing to 
recognize that alternative families exist would be to ignore an 
important demographic fact, 82 even if these alternative living 
arrangements are not in accord with a particular religious 
ideal. 83 
80. See, e.g., Kent W. Bartholomew, The Definition of "Family" in Missouri Local 
Zoning Ordinances: An Analysis of the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST. 
LOUTS U. L.J. 631, 662 (2008) (noting that "the breakdown of the traditional family has 
been identified as one of the root causes of violence among children"); Randall T. 
Shepard, Why the Courts Matter in Building a Strong Economy, 36 IND. L. REV. 91:J, 
914 (2003) ("Many of the social problems that have plagued American society arc 
caused by the breakdown of families."); Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Class, 
Race, and fi'amily Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567, 597 (2007) ("'Governments cannot easily 
alleviate the harms that flow from the breakdown of the nuclear family."). 
81. Cf. June Carbone, Review Essay, Is Fertility the Unspoken Issue in the Debate 
between Liberal and Conservative Family Values? :12 LAW & Soc. IN<~UII{Y 809, 818 
(2007) ("The goal should accordingly he to discourage single-parent families."); Sherrine 
M. Walker & Christopher D. Wall, Feminist Jurisprudence: Justice and Care, 11 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 255, 272 (1997) ("Many are willing to argue that single parent families are 
the single largest cause of the breakdown of society."). 
82. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 4il U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 
805 (2009) ("The percentage of single parent households increased from 9% of all 
households in 1990 to 16% in 2000."). 
S:J. Some commentators seem to forget that the claimed right is an exemption 
from exposure to religiously objectionable lifestyles, which might include a whole host 
of arrangements involving individuals of the same sex or of different sexes. lt thus 
simply will not do as an answer to point out that many of the alternative living 
arrangements involve different-sex couples, as if that justifies making a special 
exemption for LGI3T families even though many families would he found religiously 
unacceptable. See Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriage and Public School Curricula: 
Preserving Parental Ri[Jhts to Direct the Education of Their Children, i32 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 361, :166---67 (2007) ("This essay parries these objections by pointing out that as 
regrettable as developments with regard to marriage and alternative living 
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Consider a particular tradition that does not approve of 
divorce. It would be a disservice to all concerned to refuse to 
acknowledge that many households contain children living 
with a divorced parent, even if some religious traditions 
disapprove of divorce. Or, suppose that a particular religion 
disapproves of religious intermarriage. Would this mean that 
an elementary school teacher should consider carefully whether 
to mention the marriage of Chelsea Clinton and Marc 
Mezvinsky if that wedding were somehow relevant on a 
particular day?84 
Presumably, one of the reasons that these different types of 
families were included in the Diversity Book Bag was to 
reassure children who were living in nontraditional families. 
Consider a different book in the first grade curriculum, to 
which parents objected, Molly's Family, which was about a girl 
who was teased because she had two mothers. 85 Eventually, 
she learns to feel better about herself and her family once she 
appreciates that there are many different types of families. 86 
But developing an appreciation that there are many types of 
families and that one should not feel ashamed for living in an 
unusual family might be helpful for any number of children. 
For example, children living in a very religiously conservative 
family might come to appreciate that they are not somehow 
wrong or bad for being raised in a setting that does not mirror 
the setting of many of their classmates. 
Other plaintiffs objected to the reading of King and King, in 
which one prince falls in love with another.87 The Wirthlins did 
not want that book read to their second grader, and wanted 
advance notice of what books would be covered so that they 
could have their child exempted when the material would 
contravene their religious beliefs. 88 It might be helpful to flesh 
arrangements are, they are still, by-and-large, taking place within the context of 
heterosexual, rather than homosexual, liaisons."). 
81. See For Quiet Bride, Dress Speaks Volumes, WATERLOO REGION REC., Aug. 3, 
2010, at D6, available at 2010 WLNR 15397005 ("The ceremony was conducted by a 
rabbi and a reverend as Chelsea Clinton is Methodist and Mezvinsky is Jewish."). 
85. See Parker, 511 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) ("When Jacob entered first grade 
that fall, his classroom's book collection included ... Molly:~ Family, a picture book 
about a girl who is at first made to feel embarrassed by a classmate because she has 




88. /d. at 102. 
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out what it would mean for the state to be asserting something 
that contravenes one's religious beliefs. Presumably, it does not 
violate the Wirthlins' religious beliefs for the state to say that 
some jurisdictions or religious traditions recognize same-sex 
marriage,89 even if the Wirthlins' religious tradition does not. 
Suppose that a particular religion does not approve of 
interracial marriage90 or, perhaps, does not approve of religious 
intermarriage.91 Presumably, mentioning that such couples 
exist would not contravene those religious beliefs, even if the 
religion at issue would not recognize the marriages. Or, 
suppose that a particular religion believes in the importance of 
following the Biblical command to be fruitful and multiplyY2 
Presumably, it does not contravene religious beliefs to mention 
that there are childless couples or that some individuals 
voluntarily choose not to have children, even if the religion 
advocates having children. 
A separate question involves whether legitimate 
pedagogical interests are served by mentioning diverse families 
more generally, or families involving same-sex parents in 
particular. The Parker court noted that the state has an 
interest in promoting tolerance, 93 mentioning "the role of public 
education in the preparation of students for citizenship."94 
Thus, the inclusion was designed to further legitimate state 
objectives, and there was no evidence that the discussion of this 
vast array of types of families was included as a subtle or not-
so-subtle attempt to undermine the teachings of a particular 
religious group. 
89. Jamal Greene, Comment, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 111 YALE L.J. 
1989, 1995 (2005) ("Although many religions do not recognize same-sex marriage, 
many others do."). 
90. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 571, 580 (198il) ("Bob 
Jones University is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedicated to 
the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs .... The 
sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating 
and marriage."). 
91. Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation: Foreign Men, "Our" Women, 
and the Law, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 179, 479 (2009) (discussing the "ancient 
proscription against intermarriage, based on a broad range of prohibitions against 
mixing religion, race, status, nationality and so forth, is common to numerous societies 
and religions that have thrived at different times and in various places"). 
92. See Holmes Rolston Ill, Essay, Saving Creation: Faith Shaping 
Environmental Policy, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y ReN. 121, 117 (2010) ("'n Genesis 1:22, God 
says, more simply: "Be fruitful and multiply.''). 
93. Parker, 514 F.iid at 95. 
94. !d. 
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Merely because the state believes that valid interests are 
served by informing children about the different kinds of 
families living in the state or the country does not mean that 
parents will agree with that assessment. As the First Circuit 
noted, parents might choose not to send their children to public 
schools, instead opting to send their children to private schools 
or, as a different court noted, to do home-schooling.95 However, 
those parents deciding to send their children to the public 
schools do not have a constitutional right to direct schools in 
how to educate their own or others' children.96 Nor do the 
parents have a constitutional right to decide that their children 
will attend public school part-time, for example, to receive 
instruction in only certain specified subjects, if such an option 
is not afforded as a general matter by the school.97 
Were parents to have a right to determine the content of 
the curriculum, many public schools would simply be unable to 
operate. Parents might disagree both about curricular content 
and about the amount of class time that should be spent on 
particular topics. In many cases, it would be impossible to 
satisfy the competing desires of interested parents. Further, 
even if it were possible to meet the different parental demands, 
designing the curriculum to meet the various desires 
articulated by the parents might yield a curriculum that could 
not be defended pedagogically. 
To assess the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the First 
Circuit first sought to determine the kind of harm that the 
plaintiffs had suffered. As had been true in Mozert, there was 
95. !d. at 102. See also Swanson ex rei Swanson v. Guthrie Indcp. Sch. Dist., 135 
F.3d 694, 698 (1Oth Cir. 1998) ("The policy docs not prohibit them from home-schooling 
Annie in accordance with their religious beliefs, and docs not force them to do anything 
that is contrary to those beliefs."). 
96. Parher, 514 F.3d at 102. See also Fields v. l'almdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 
1206 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[O]ncc parents make the choice as to which school their children 
will attend, their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the 
least, substantially diminished. The constitution docs not vest parents with the 
authority to interfere with a public school's decision as to how it will provide 
information to its students or what information it will provide, in its classrooms or 
otherwise."). 
97. Swanson, 135 F.ild at 702 ("Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, 
what they seck in this case is special treatment not afforded other home-schooled or 
private-schooled students. They seek an added exception to the part-time attendance 
policy, that would accommodate people who home-school for religious reasons. Nothing 
in the Free Exercise Clause requires that such special treatment be provided."). 
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no allegation of coercion in Parker. 98 Nor was there any 
allegation, for example, that listening to the teacher read King 
and King, or any of the other books that the parents objected to 
being read, somehow violated Joseph Wirthlin's religious 
duties.99 Further, it was not as if Joseph's having been read to 
in school would somehow prevent his parents from instructing 
him in a way that was more in keeping with their beliefs. 100 
While the First Circuit was willing to accept the plaintiffs' 
assertion that "the reading of King and King was precisely 
intended to influence the listening children toward tolerance of 
gay marriage," 101 the court rejected that the reading involved 
an "attempt to indoctrinate." 102 Indeed, the court suggested 
that requiring a student to read a book, without more, would 
generally not be enough to constitute religious coercion. 103 
Something more would be required to establish a constitutional 
violation, for example, forcing the student to affirm those 
ideas. 104 
So, too, merely because two books were made available to 
Jacob Parker to which his parents had religious objections did 
not suffice to prove a free exercise violation. Indeed, Jacob was 
required neither to read the books nor have them read to 
him. 105 Further, when one considers that the books did not 
"endorse gay marriage or homosexuality, or even address these 
topics explicitly, but merely describe[d] how other children 
might come from families that look different from one's own," 106 
it was difficult to see how this would involve a free exercise 
98. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105 ("The parents do not allege coercion in the form of a 
direct interference with their religious beliefs, nor of compulsion in the form of 
punishment for their beliefs."). 
99. ld. 
100. Id. ("[Tjhe mere fact that a child is exposed on occasion in public school to a 
concept offensive to a parent's religious belief does not inhibit the parent from 
instructing the child differently."). See also Fields, 427 F.:Jd at 1200 ("['!']here is no 
fundamental right of parents to be the exclusive provider of information regarding 
sexual matters to their children, either independent of their right to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children or encompassed by it. We also hold that 
parents have no due process or privacy right to override the determinations of public 
schools as to the information to which their children will be exposed while enrolled as 
students."). 
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violation. Thus, there was some question whether the plaintiffs 
had suffered a cognizable harm. 
When the state describes the family settings that exist, it is 
acknowledging but not necessarily legitimizing those 
families. 107 There is something rather unsettling in implicitly if 
not explicitly suggesting that various types of families should 
not even be mentioned unless they have the requisite religious 
approval. While individuals are free to believe according to 
their own lights, 108 those beliefs should not determine who is 
even acknowledged to exist. 
There is also something unsettling in suggesting that the 
contents of the curriculum should be determined by the 
taxpayers in the community or the parents of children in the 
schools, as if the subject matters should be chosen by a vote 
during a Parent Teacher Association meeting. 109 If students 
are going to be able to thrive in this world, they are going to 
have to be able to work with people both like and unlike 
themselves. Pretending that whole segments of society do not 
exist will help no one, even if those segments of society are not 
popular locally. 
Certainly, many of the parents who were challenging what 
was being taught in their children's school were not 
challenging the subject per se by saying that it simply should 
not be included in the curriculum, 110 but were instead 
suggesting that they did not want their children exposed to the 
subjects. 111 Yet, such a request is more difficult to grant than 
might first appear. 112 Suppose, for example, that a child were 
107. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this. See Russo. supra note 83, 
at :371 (discussing "teaching that essentially legitimizes same-sex marriage by 
presenting it as one of an array of familial alternatives"). 
108. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 1\94 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The free exercise of 
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires."). 
109. Cf. Russo, supra note 83, at il79 (suggesting that "educational leaders and 
hoards should focus on input from their real stakeholders-parents and community 
members"). 
110. Parker, 514 F.8d at 102 ("Plaintiffs specifically disclaim any intent to seek 
control of the school's curriculum or to impose their will on others. They do not seek to 
change the choice of books available to others."). 
111. /d. 
112. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate some of the difficulties that 
might be entail(~d. See Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: 
Revisiting Mozert after 20 Years, 38 .J.L. & Euuc. 83, 96 (2009) ("Parents should, 
therefore, be extended the right to exempt their children from curricular requirements 
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excused from reading about the different types of families that 
exist. Even so, during a different part of the day, one student 
might refer to readings or a discussion from an earlier part of 
the day or, perhaps, from the previous week. It might be quite 
difficult to prevent the religious child from being exposed to 
these "objectionable" ideas. Further, parents might object to a 
whole host of subjects that might yield understandings 
contrary to faith, which would both make it very difficult to 
anticipate when the topics would be raised. And, even if 
possible to anticipate, might mean that the children would be 
exempted from a significant percentage of class activities. 113 
While it might seem that exemptions would only affect the 
students who would be excused from certain activities, it is 
plausible to think that the effect would be more widespread. 
Consider a teacher who wants to discuss or refer to something 
in the afternoon that had been covered earlier in the day. 
Suppose that this teaching moment involved a sensitive subject 
matter for at least some of the students in the room. The 
teacher would have to decide whether to excuse the students 
for a few moments while making the reference or engaging in a 
limited discussion. It would be unsurprising if the teacher 
would decide simply not to discuss the issue rather than spend 
extra class time excusing particular students and then 
arranging to have them return to the class. 
At least two difficulties are suggested by the scenario, in 
which the teacher forgoes saying or doing something that she 
believes would be pedagogically useful because she might 
otherwise have to take class time to excuse particular students. 
First, it might mean that the curriculum could in effect be 
controlled by those who want their children excused, which 
might mean that particular subject areas would be much less 
likely to be addressed in class. 114 Second, it should not be 
thought that very few discrete areas would be subject to this 
in the public schools, at least when their objections are prompted by religious or moral 
convictions."). 
113. See Emily J. Brown, Note, When Insiders Become Outsiders: Parental 
Objections to Public School Sex J<;ducation Programs, 59 DUKE L.J. 109, 11il (2009) 
(suggesting that Parker illustrates the practical problems posed when parents object 
"to the general worldview promulgated by a public sehoul curriculum"). 
111. Ironically, some commentators complain that including the subject matter in 
the first place somehow involves use of a heckler's veto, see Russo, supra note 8:3, at 
:no, whereas it is much more plausible to suggest that refusing to discuss the material 
involves deference to such a veto. 
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reduced coverage as a brief consideration of some of these cases 
reveals. 
Some parents have articulated religious objections to classic 
children's authors such as A.A. Milne, Dr. Seuss, and Maurice 
Sendak. 115 But this might mean that Charlotte's Web 116 or 
Winnie the Pooh 117 would be materials that might be avoided 
either on the reading list or, perhaps, in later discussions. 
Would students be able to get an education even if these 
materials were not included? Yes. Would their educations be 
diminished if these and other works were excluded because 
some parents found the content religiously objectionable? Yes. 
Some commentators imply that books like Diversity Book 
Bag, Molly's Family, and King and King are being foisted on 
the schools by "a small number of activists attempting to 
change the nature and meaning of marriage." 118 It is especially 
ironic that such a claim would be made in the context of an 
analysis of Parker. The first two of those books did not even 
discuss marriage, so it is difficult to see how those books could 
fairly be characterized as seeking to foist this allegedly foreign 
concept on unsuspecting children. Even King v. King was read 
in a state that already recognized same-sex marriage, so it 
could hardly be fairly described as attempting to subvert the 
state's definition or understanding of marriage. 
Suppose, however, that we were talking about a state in 
which same-sex marriage was not recognized. Even so, it must 
be remembered that this was a fairy tale. Many things happen 
in fairy tales that not only will not occur locally but are 
physically impossible. Yet, same-sex marriage is recognized in 
various states and countries, even if it is not (yet) recognized in 
the particular state where a book is being read. It would be at 
best an unusual educational principle that precluded 
discussion of anything that was not legally recognized within a 
particular state. 
Regrettably, some commentators seek to justify excluding 
certain books or subjects because those books present a picture 
of the world that the commentators reject, empirical evidence 
undermining the commentators' v1ews notwithstanding. 
115. See Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1994). 
116. E. B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE'S WEB (1952). 
117. A. A. MILN~:, WINNIE THE POOH (1926). 
118. Russo, supra note 8il, at 370. 
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Consider the claim that "the co-parenting message of marriage 
is weakened when marriage is redefined to include relations 
among same-sex couples that are designed for sexual pleasure 
and lack the ability to co-parent." 119 Yet, it is difficult to see 
how the co-parenting message is undermined by couples who 
not only do not lack the ability to co-parent, but are in fact co-
parenting. Indeed, various studies suggest that same-sex 
couples are parenting quite well. 120 
Several of the plaintiffs in Goodridge were same-sex couples 
living with their minor children. 121 To say that they could not 
co-parent is simply wrong. It seems safe to assume that some 
parents do not approve of the message sent in the Diversity 
Book Bag, not because of the message's falsity but because of 
its truth. LGBT families exist and are thriving, even if certain 
religious groups disapprove of them. 
Certainly, commentators might note that members of a 
same-sex married couple cannot each be biologically related to 
the same child. But we have long ago rejected that marriage 
should only be for individuals who can have a child through 
their union, and numerous couples both of the same sex and of 
different sexes find themselves parenting children to whom 
they have no biological connection. If this is somehow 
destructive of the basic understanding of marriage, then 
marriage is in serious trouble. 
It is at best ironic that commentators seem to believe same-
sex married couples who are raising their children do more to 
sever the link between marriage and parenting than do 
heterosexual married couples who choose not to have children. 
The claim here of course is not that voluntarily childless 
couples should not be able to marry but merely that some of the 
arguments offered against same-sex couples seem much more 
persuasive when applied to other groups. But this suggests 
that even more groups are at risk of being marginalized by 
119. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attach on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a 
Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (20(l7). 
120. See e.g., U. Va. Study: Adoptive Children of Lesbian and Gay Couples 
Developing Well, DAILY NEWS LEADER, ,July 26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
1191797:-l (discussing a study finding "that whether or not adoptive children were 
developing in positive ways was unrelated to the sexual orientation of their adoptive 
parents"). 
121. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 200:3) 
(describing several same-sex couples raising minor children). 
2] PARENTS, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS 569 
continuing efforts to restrict school discussions to those 
promoting a particular viewpoint. 
III. CONCLUSION 
How should a school's curriculum be affected by a state's 
deciding to recognize same-sex marriage? As a general matter, 
it should not make much difference. It is too late in the day to 
treat same-sex marriage as if it was a contradiction in terms. 122 
Whether or not same-sex marriage is recognized in one state 
should not affect whether the topic can be mentioned. Indeed, 
unless there can be general agreement that mentioning a topic, 
without more, cannot be construed as endorsing a particular 
view, children will be at risk of being given a woefully 
inadequate education because so many subjects would be 
objectionable as endorsements. 
As Parker and Mozert illustrate, parents may have religious 
objections to subjects involving legally permissible or even 
recognized relationships or activities. Figuring out how to 
acknowledge the existence of LGBT families without burdening 
free exercise may involve difficult line-drawing in some cases. 
However, for the most part, whether a particular state 
recogmzes same-sex relationships should not determine 
whether the existence of such relationships should be 
acknowledged, and the claim that it should, imposes a litmus 
test that would normally never be imposed. Children should be 
taught in age-appropriate ways about the world in which they 
live, and their exposure to the world should not be limited to 
those subjects that have been given a religious stamp of 
approval. 
122. See Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 217, 271 (2007) ("When same-sex couples first began to petition for 
marriage licenses, for example, some state officials simply denied the possibility of 
same-sex marriage, describing it as a 'contradiction m terms."'). 
